Washington Law Review
Volume 13

Number 2

4-1-1938

Survey of the New Federal Rules: The New Practice in the Federal
Courts in Civil Cases Cognizable at Law or in Equity
Alfred J. Schweppe

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Alfred J. Schweppe, State Bar Journal, Survey of the New Federal Rules: The New Practice in the Federal
Courts in Civil Cases Cognizable at Law or in Equity, 13 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 162 (1938).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol13/iss2/9

This State Bar Journal is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Survey of the New Federal Rules
The New Practice in the Federal Courts in Civil Cases
Cognizable at Law or in Equity
By

ALFRED J. SCHWEPPE,

of the Seattle Bar

A new era in federal practice, in suits of a civil nature whether
cognizable as cases at law or in equity, has been ushered in by the

act of Congress of June 19, 19341.
Acting under the authority of this statute the Supreme Court
of the United States, with the aid of a distinguished advisory committee,2 undertook the preparation of a "unified system of general
rules for cases in equity and actions at law in the District Courts
148 Stat. 1064; U. S. C., title 28, §§ 723(b), 723(c), reading as follows:
"Be it enacted ... That the Supreme Court of the United States shall

have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of
the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure
in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor
modify the substantive rights of any litigant. They shall take effect
six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict
therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
"Sec. 2. The court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed
by it for cases In equity with those in actions at law so as to secure
one form of civil action and procedure for both: Provided, however, That
in such union of rules the right of trial by jury as at common law and
declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such united rules shall not take effect
until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General
at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close
of such session."
2
William D. Mitchell, of New York City, chairman.
Scott M. Loftin, of Jacksonville, Florida, president of the American
Bar Association.
George W. Wickersham, of New York City, president of the American
Law Institute.
George Wharton Pepper, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, replacing
George W. Wickershain (deceased).
Wilbur H. Cherry, of Minenapolls, Minnesota, Professor of Law at the
University of Minnesota.
Charles E. Clark, of New Haven, Connecticut, Dean of the Law School
of Yale University.
Armistead M. Dobie, of University, Virginia, Dean of the Law School
of the University of Virginia.
Robert G. Dodge, of Boston, Massachusetts.
George Donworth, of Seattle, Washington.
Joseph G. Gamble, of Des Moines, Iowa.
Monte M. Lemann, of New Orleans, Louisiana.
Edmund M. Morgan, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, Professor of Law
at Harvard University.
Warren Olney, Jr., of San Francisco, California.
Edson R. Sunderland, of Ann Arbor, Michigan, Professor of Law at
the University of Michigan.
Edgar B. Tolman, of Chicago, Illinois.
Charles E. Clark, of New Haven, Connecticut, reporter to the Advisory
Committee.
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of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure
for both classes of cases, while maintaining inviolate the right of
trial by jury in accordance with the Seventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, and without altering substantive
rights."'
The Advisory Committee worked for two and one-half years,
widely circulated tentative printed drafts of the rules4 among the
bench and bar of the country for criticism5 and in November, 1937,
submitted its final report to the court. On December 20, 1937, the
Supreme Court, after having modified in a few minor respects the
final draft of the Advisory Committee, announced its adoption of
the new rules so prepared and, as provided in the act, transmitted
them to the Attorney General for submission to Congress.' And
the Attorney General, in turn, in accordance with the act, submitted the rules for examination to Congress, 7 which has referred
them to the Judiciary Committees and ordered them printed.
If Congress takes no adverse action thereon, no affirmative Congressional action being required to make them effective s, the new
rules, to be known and cited as "FEDERAL RuLEs op Civm PROCEDURE" , 9 will take effect on September 1, 1938.
Thus an objective long sought by the bench and bar of the
United States, namely, to remove from the federal civil practice
in actions at law the intricacies and pitfalls heretofore existing
therein for the casual practitioner in the federal courts, has at
last been attained.' 0 And, in addition, the great gain has been
made, under the initiative of the Supreme Court itself, of establishing only a single procedure for civil cases cognizable at law
or in equity.
The important step toward code practice and toward the consolidation of the federal courts of law and equity described by,
Chief Justice Taft in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank," in discussing the act of March 3, 191512 permitting equitable defenses
'295 U. S. 774.
'Preliminary draft of May, 1936; report of April, 1937; final report
of November, 1937.
'See XXIV, A=ERCAN BAR Assocr.ATio JOURNAL, 97.
'See letter of Chief Justice to the Attorney General dated December
20, 1937. As to the purpose of this submission to Congress, see 49 HARv.
L. REV., 1303, 1309. Whether amendments to the new rules, if made
hereafter, must be submitted to Congress is a debatable question. See
H nv. L. REv. 1303, 1309-10.
'See Government Printing Office copy of the new rules printed as
House Document No. 460 of the seventy-fifth Congress, third session.
Copies may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, United

States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., for 15 cents per

COPY.

'49 HIAv. L. REV. 1303, 1309.
Rule 85.

°See SimrKs, FEDERAL PRACTCE (1934) § 4; 49 HAnv. L. REV. 1303;
XXIV, AmzarcA BAR AsSOcIATION JOURNAL, 97.
"260 U. S. 235, 67 L. Ed. 232, 43 S. Ct. 118.
'U. S. C., title 28, § 398; Judicial Code, § 274 b.
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in actions at law, has led up to the adoption of a single code of
rules, which, so far as now appears, embodies all of the advantages
of the state codes and has eliminated their weaknesses, while at the
same time preserving trial by jury wholly intact.
Scope of New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"These new rules govern the procedure in the District Courts
of the United States in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable
as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule
81."12" It is stated in Rule 81 that these new rules do not apply

to proceedings in admiralty, nor to proceedings in bankruptcy,
nor to certain special types of proceedings listed in that rule."3
These new rules "govern all proceedings in actions brought after
they take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then
pending; except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their
application in a particular action pending when the rules take
effect would not be feasible or would
work injustice, in which event
14
the former procedure applies.'

Effect of the New Rules on the Equity Rules of 1912
"When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure become effective
they will supplant the equity rules since in general they cover the
field now covered by the equity rules and the conformity act."'"
There can be no doubt that on the effective date of the new rules,
the equity rules as heretofore known will disappear by name from
the practice, although a considerable number of them are in substance preserved in the new rules.' When the court, acting under
section 2 of the Act of June 19, 1934, undertook to "unite the
general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in
actions at law . . ." the equity rules, as such, lost their identity

in the merging process and are gone.
Effect of the New Rules on the Conformity Act of 1872
"U. S. C., title 28, sections 724 (Conformity Act), 397 (Amendments to Pleadings when case brought to wrong side of the court),
and 298 (Equitable Defenses and Equitable Relief in Actions at
Law) are superseded.' 1 7 Whether the Conformity Act is so completely superseded as is suggested in the foregoing statement is
perhaps debatable,"' but certainly, to the extent that the new rules
"'Rule 1.
"See Rule 81 for these exceptions.
'Rule 86.
15April, 1937, report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil
Procedure appointed by the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 217.
" See table contained in April, 1937 draft of the Advisory Committee,
p. 217.
"April, 1937, report of Advisory Committee, p. 3.
iscongress did not in terms abolish the Conformity Act; and repeals
by implication are not favored. U. S. v. Jackson, U. S., 58 Sup. Ct. 390.
Under the Act of June 19, 1934 (The two sections of the act must be
read together, and are so read by the Supreme Court in its initial order
under the statute, 295 U. S. 774) "all laws in conflict therewith (with
the rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court
itself) shall be of no further force and effect." (See 49 HARv. L. REV. 1303,
1310-11, 1320-21, as to the extent of this provision.) The new rules do
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cover the field formerly covered by the Conformity Act, that act
is gone, and may, except possibly for the limited purpose indicated
in the footnote' be ignored.
Function of Court Rules
"The function of court rules is to regulate the practice of the
court and to facilitate the transaction of its business... No court
rule can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate
or modify the substantive law. This is true whether the court to
which the rules apply be one of law, of equity, or of admiralty.
It is as true of rules of practice prescribed by this court for inferior tribunals, as it is of those rules which lower courts make for
their own guidance under authority conferred." 2 0 The statute2'
"See footnote 18.
"Washington-Southern Company v. Baltimore Company, 263 U. S. 629;

Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 61 F. (2d) 736, certiorari denied 289
U. S. 740; Christopher v. Brusselback, 58 Sup. Ct. 350; Clymer v. U. S.,
38 F. (2d) 581.
"See footnote 1.
not cover every conceivable point of -practice. True, Rule 83 seems to
cover every matter of practice not referred to in the rules by providing
that the district court in each district may make rules not inconsistent
with the new rules, and that "in all cases not provided for 'by rule, the
district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent
with these rules." But if this last quoted provision is intended to be
a delegation of power to the district courts -by the Supreme Court, then
it hardly seems warranted by the enabling statute, which authorizes the
Supreme Court itself to prescribe the practice and procedure by rules
and merely abrogates "all laws in conflict therewith," to-wit, in conflict
with the Supreme Court's own prescribed rules of practice and procedure,
and does not authorize the Supreme Court to delegate to the district
courts the power to make rules of practice and procedure. To illustrate, if the Supreme Court, purporting to act under the enabling
statute, had merely adopted a single rule, in substance like Rule 83

above, delegating the rule-making function to the district courts, would

it have been the proper exercise of the statutory power, and would the
Conformity Act have been abrogated thereby? While it has been urged

(April, 1937, report of Advisory Committee, pp. 214, 215) that under

Equity Rule 79 the district court could make equity rules additional to

those prescribed by the Supreme Court, it is plain that this right is

reserved to the district courts by statute (U. S. C., title 28, § 723; see
also § 730), and does not exist by virtue of delegation from the Supreme
Court. And though it is also suggested (April, 1937, report of the Ad-

visory Committee, p. 214) that new Rule 83 "substantially continues
U. S. C., title 28, § 731 (Rules of practice in district courts)," it would
seem quite plain in -thelight of recent decisions (Chisholm v. Gilmer, 297

U. S.99; Aetna Insurance Company v. Kennedy, 301 U. S.389; Eley v.
Gamble, 75 F. (2d) 171, C. C. A. (4th); Sartor v. United Gas Public
Service Company, 3 Fed. Supp. 943; Barrett v. Virginian Railway Coin:
pany, 250 U. S.473; Parris Irrigation District v. Turnbull, 215 Fed. 562;
see, however, Shepard v. Adams, 168 U. S. 618; Ellicott Machinery Corp.
v. Vogt Bros. Mfg. Company, 267 Fed. 945, certiorari denied 254 U. S.
607) that the right of district courts under § 731 to prescribe rules in
law actions, inconsistent with the state practice, has been conclusively

denied. Consequently it appears to be a permissible conclusion that all
matters affecting suits of a civil nature cognizable at law, not covered
by the new rules, are still subject to the Conformity Act; and that, as to
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under which the new rules were adopted expressly provides that
the rule shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant. New Rule 82 specifically states that therules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of
the district courts of the United States or the venue of actions
therein.
Effect of Court Rules
The rule-making power has been exercised by the Supreme
Court
since the earliest times under direct Congressional authority.22 "A rule of court thus authorized and made has the force
of law.' '23 Such a rule "is binding upon the court as well as
upon parties to an action, and cannot be dispensed with to suit
the circumstances of any particular case. The courts may rescind
or repeal their rules without doubt; or, in establishing them, may
reserve the exercise of discretion for particular cases. But the
rule once made without any such qualification must be applied to
all cases that come within it, until it is repealed by the authority
which made it. ' ' 2 4 "Where no discretionary power is reserved to
the trial judge in the rule, he cannot dispense with it in particular
=44 YALE L. J. 387, 391; 1 WASH. L. REV. 163, 171; Wayland v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 22, 42-43, 45-48, 50, per Marshall, C. J., in the federal
system the rule-making power is considered a power delegated by Congress, not an inherent power. See also 49 HARV. L. REv. 1303, 1309. But

see Christopher v. Brusselback, 58 Sup. Ct. 350.
2Weil v. Neary, 278 U. S. 160, 169, and cases cited; Rio Grande Irrigation Co. v. Gildersleeve, 174 U. S. 603, 608; Superior Fire Insurance
Co. v. Martin, 80 F. (2d) 275, C. C. A. (7th); Galveston Dry Dock Co.
v. Standard Dredging Co., 40 F. (2d) 442, C. C. A. (2d).
"Rio Grande Irrigation Co. v. Gildersleeve, 174 U. S. 603, 608-9.
such matters, the rule-making power of the district courts under § 731
would only extend to the making of rules which reasonably conform to
the local practice. (Janoske v. Porter, 64 F. (2d) 958, C. C. A. (6th);
Chisholm v. Gilmer, 297 U. S. 99.)
Unless, therefore, it can be said that the new rules of procedure,
disregarding Rule 83, have themselves covered the entire field formerly
governed by the Conformity Act (having in mind that there were numerous exceptions to the applicability of the Conformity Act (see section 10
of this text)), there may perhaps still be a minor field for its operation.
Under this view as to civil actions cognizable at law the new rules
would merely render the Conformity Act inoperative pro tanto, and it
would still remain in effect as to all matters not covered by the new
rules, notwithstanding the rule-making power of the district courts
under § 731 which has been held to be inoperative when in conflict with
state practice under the Conformity Act.
To remove all doubt as to the supplementary rule-making power of
the district courts under § 731 and to restore it to its full vigor, it would
appear to be desirable that Congress expressly repeal the Conformity
Act.
It may be urged on the other hand that the Supreme Court in the
adoption of Rule 83 purporting to confer rule-making power on the district
courts, or substantially continuing § 731 in effect, has by implication
rendered the Conformity Act inoperative even as to matters not covered
by the new rules, but it would appear to be at least doubtful whether
Rule 83 is the kind of a rule which under the enabling act (Act of
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cases. 25 A breach of a court rule is, however, a mere error of procedure not affecting jurisdiction.2 6
Supplementary Rules of District Court
By Rule 83 each district court by action of a majority of the
judges thereof may from time to time make and amend rules
governing its practice not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and in all cases not provided for by rule may
regulate their practice in any manner not.inconsistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Copies of such rules must be
furnished to the Supreme Court. It has been suggested 27 that this
rule substantially continues U. S. C., title 28, section 731 (Rules
,of Practice in the District Courts). The status and effect
of this
28
rule has also been discussed in a preceding paragraph.
It should be noted that local rules of the district court are not
judicially noticed29 in the appellate court and should be brought
up in the record.

Law and Equity Under the New Rules
While the new rules provide for "one form of action" to be
known as a "civil action" 30 applicable to "all suits of a civil
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity'"'8° , the
rules merely apply to procedure, and, of course, do not destroy
the substantive differences between law and equity any more
"Itbid., Superior Fire Insurance Co. v. Martin, 80 F. (2d) 275; C. C. A.
(7th); but see United States v. Tucker, 65 F. (2d) 661, C. C. A. (4th);
Spokane Interstate Fair Assn. v. Fidelity and Deposit Company, 15 F.
(2d) 48, C. C. A. (9th); Puget Sound Navigation Co. v. Nelson, 41 F. (2d)
256, C. C. A. (9th).
"Abbott v. Brown, 241 U. S. 606, 609.
-"April, 1937, report of Advisory Committee, p. 214.
"See footnote 18.
"Washington A. & G. Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles, 19 Wall. 611, 22 L.
Ed. 203; Abbott v. Brown, 241 U. S. 606, 609.
"ORule 2.
8"Rule 1.
June 19, 1934) will have the result that "all laws in conflict therewith
shall be of no further force and effect". Moreover, if Rule 83 Is merely
a rule substantially continuing § 731, the rule probably cannot give
§ 731 any better status than it has at the present time, unaided by the
rule. It would seem persuasively arguable that under the-enabling statute
only the Supreme Court's own formulated rules of practice and procedure
can render the Conformity Act inoperative pro tanto, and that it cannot
be done by a rule purporting to grant supplementary rule-making power
to the district courts.
However that may be, there may perhaps be occasional instances
where questions of practice arise which are not covered by the new
rules, and within the field formerly covered by the Conformity Act, and
where it may be of importance to determine whether the trial judge
shall follow the state practice, or adopt a practice of his own, or make
a rule conforming to the state practice, or differing from it. It would
seem to be the safest course to follow the state practice, or to make
rules reasonably conforming thereto. (See Janoske v. Porter, 64 F. (2d)
958, C. C. A. (6th)).
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than has been done under the state codes. Merely the distinction
between law and equity procedure has been wiped out. "What was
an action at law before the code, is still an action founded on
legal principles; and what was a bill in equity before the code,
is still a civil action founded on principles of equity. ' 31 The distinction between law and equity is engrafted in the Constitution
itself.3 2 While under the new rules there is now but "one form
of action", legal and equitable issves remain as before, and trial
by jury is fully preserved. 3 Any number of legal and equitable
claims may be joined in the complaint, answer and reply ;34 and
any party desiring to have any legal issue in the cause tried by a
jury has the right fully preserved. 35 Issues on which jury trial is
not demanded are triable by the court, unless the court in its own
discretion orders a jury trial on any or all issues. 36 "When certain
of the issues are to be tried by jury and others by the court, the
court may determine the sequence in which such issues shall be
tried. '3 7 This presents a simple and workable system of procedure.38
Federal Practice Prior to 1872
Prior to 1872 the practice and procedure in the federal courts
in actions at law and suits in equity was subject to the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court. This rule-making power dates back
to the Permanent Process Act of 1792. 3' In 184240 Congress re3'Liberty Oil Company v. Condon Dank, 260 U. S. 235, 242.
3-Thompson v. Central Ohio R. Co., 6 Wall. 137; Ellis v. Davis, 109
U. S. 497; Twist v. Prairie Oil Co., 274 U. S. 684.
"YALE L. J. 1022, 1041-4; 44 YALE L. J. 1291, 1296, 1298; Bisnovich v.
British American Ins. Co., 100 Conn. 240, 123 Atl. 339; Roy v. Moore,
85 Conn. 159, 82 Atl. 233.
3'Rule 18.
-Rule 38.
"Rule 39(b).
"April, 1937, report of Advisory Committee, p. 100, citing Liberty
Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U. S. 235; see also said April, 1937,
report, p. 149, and see next footnote.
"See Bisnovich v. British American Ins. Co., 100 Conn. 240, 123 Atl.
339; Roy v. Moore, 85 Conn. 159, 82 Atl. 233; and see Liberty Oil Co.
v. Condon, 260 U. S. 235, 67 L. Ed. 232, 43 Sup. Ct. 118; Enelow v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379; Lhanferoke C. & S. Corp. v. Westchester S. Corp., 293 U. S. 449; Whitney Co. v. Johnson, C. C. A. (9th),
14 F. (2d) 24, certiorari denied, 273 U. S. 734, 71 L. Ed. 864, 47 Sup. Ct.
242. In SimKIxs, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1934) § 59, discussing "Equitable
Pleas on the Law Side", it was said: "The equitable and legal issues can
now be determined in a single suit, the defendant being no longer required to enjoin the suit at law in order to avail himself of any equitable
defense he -may have In the case. As stated, the equitable issue will first
be determined by the chancellor alone, and then, if an issue of law remains, it is triable by a jury. It seems, however, that, in the absence
of a request to have the equitable issue first determined by the court,
if the entire case is submitted to the jury, the defendant cannot complain."
"1 Stat. 275; U. S. C. A., Title 28, § 731; Rev. Stat. § 918; Amy v.
Watertown, 130 U. S. 301, 303. See 44 YALE L. J. 387, 391-2.
'05 Stat. 518.
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affirmed the rule-making power of the Supreme Court in suits at
common law, in admiralty and in equity. 41 But because the rulemaking power in law cases had not been exercised, 42 Congress, on
June 1, 1872, while continuing in the Supreme Court the power
43
and authority to make general rules in equity and admiralty,
withdrew from that court the rule-making power with respect to
actions at common law by the enactment of the Conformity Act44 ,
which required the practice in actions at law to conform, as near as
may be, to the state practice.
The Conformity Act of 1872
The Conformity Act45, designed to bring about uniformity in
state and federal procedure in common law causes, provided in substance that the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding in civil actions at law should conform "as near as may
be" to the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the
state within which such courts are held, "any rule of court to the
contrary notwithstanding." By the elimination of the circuit
courts by the Judiciary Act of 1911, which went into effect January
1, 1912, the act, of course, applied to the district courts only.
Until the effective date of the new "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" on September 1, 1938, civil actions at law will be governed by this statute.4" Practice, however, under the Conformity
Act never proved satisfactory because, while conformity in a considerable number of instances was required, many exceptions developed to conformity.
Further Express Extension of Rule-Making Power Desirable
While an admirable result has been attained in setting up by
rules of court a clear and simple practice in the trial courts in civil
cases cognizable at law and in equity, with some provisions bearing
on appeals to the circuit court of appeals 48 , the Act of June 19,
1934 relates to proceedings in the district courts. Disparity still
exists in the practice on appeals in the federal court system, direct
"Friedenstein v. U. S., 125 U. S. 224, 232; Amy v. Watertown, 130
U. S. 301, 303.
-44 YALE L. . 387, 392.
11U. S. C., title 28, § 730; Rev. Stat. § 917.
"17 Stat. 197; R. S. § 914; U. S. C., title 28, § 724; Amy v. Watertown,
130 U. S. 301, 303.
46U. S. C., title 28, § 724; Rev. Stat. § 914.
"ISee footnote 18; Chlsholm v. Gilmer, 297 U. S. 99.
"rHerron v. Southern P. Co., 283 U. S. 91; Hein v. Westinghouse Airbrake Co., 168 Fed. 766, 769; see SIm-Is, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1934) § 3;
44 YALE L. J. 387, 401, 409.
41See Rule 73, 75, 52; and see May, 1936, preliminary draft of Ad-

visory Committee, pp. XI, XV.
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appeals from the district court to the supreme court being taken
by one method,4 9 and to the circuit court of appeals by another. 0
And, of course, appeals from the highest court of a state to the
Supreme Court of the United States are not affected by the act,
but are controlled by the Act of April 26, 19281 abolishing the
writ of error and substituting an appeal,5 2 and "must be sought,
allowed and perfected in conformity with the statutes theretofore
providing for a writ of error' .53 This undesirable variety in appellate procedure comes about because the rule-making act of June
19, 1934, relates to the district courts. 4 Now that the great step
forward has been taken to simplify and render uniform procedure
in the trial court, it would seem that the next step would be an
act of Congress clearly authorizing the same simplification and
uniformity of appellate procedure in the federal court system.
This could be accomplished by an act specifically dealing with
appeals only, thus supplementing the existing act of June 19, 1934,
without risk of its abolition or impairment, or by a broad rulemaking act authorizing the Supreme Court of the United States
to deal by rule with the entire practice and procedure, in all
classes of cases and proceedings, in the trial courts and on appeal.55
49

See Rule 72, which is merely descriptive of the present practice.
5"Rules 73, 75.
11U. S. C., title 28, § 861 (b).
52United States Sup. Ct., Rule 46 (2); Nashville R. Co. v. White, 278
U. S. 456, 460; Great Northern R. Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U. S. 503, 506.
=Ibid.

"See 49, HARv. L. REV. 1303, 1307-8.
"See the broad rule-making act of the State of Washington, Chap. 118,
Laws of 1925 Extraordinary Session; REM. REV. STAT. OF WASH., 13-1
and 13-2; see 49 HAav. L. REV. 1303.

Legislative Committee Seeks Material
The Legislative Committee of the State Bar Association, charged with
the duty of going down the line for such needed legislation as shall
be called to its attention by the members of the bar, asks that lawyers
encountering situations that point to needed correction of existing legislation, or the passage of new legislation, report these matters immediately
to the committee. This committee is in a position to speak on behalf
3f the entire bar on legislative matters and stands ready to act when
appropriate subjects are brought to its attention. The code is far from
perfect. Address communications concerning needed changes to the
Legislative Committee, State Bar Association, 655 Dexter Horton Building, Seattle.

